Understanding ex nihilo

One creationist statement often made is that the Hebrew word for "create", bara (e.g. Gen 1:1) means creatio ex nihilo, or, creation out of nothing. Unfortunately, this is not true.

The verb itself does not inherently mean that the object being created comes out of thin (non-existent) air. Rather, it is simply puts the focus on the created thing as opposed to how it was created. God is always the subject of the verb, so it does indeed refer to a special kind of creation, but God does use pre-existing material at times.

For example, in Gen 1:26 God decides to "make" (Hebrew, asa) man. Then in the next verse, it says God created (bara) man. We know that God used dust to make man, so this is one of many cases where bara is used of creation with pre-existing materials.

If you have the ability to look up every time the verb bara is used, you will quickly see that in many instances throughout Scripture it simply cannot mean creation out of nothing.

That does not negate the doctrine of ex nihilo, it just means we have to prove it from the context of Genesis 1 and from the rest of Scripture, which I think is easy to do and has been done and does not need to be done here.

Individuality of Adam

That may be a bad post title, but it was the best I could come up with in five seconds.

Some (many?) believe that Adam was not a literal person. Evangelicals who hold to a form of theistic evolution which regards the beginning of Genesis as non-literal say that, among other things, since the Hebrew word for Adam is phonetically similar (derived?) from the word for ground, the pronoun Adam does not a proper noun of an individual, but a type/species. Probably other reasons are given for holding to this, but regardless the point is that Adam was not a literal person.

Here is a question for those who would hold to this. You can hold to a symbolic or allegorical interpretation of Genesis 1-3, but what about the rest of Scripture that refers to Adam as a real person? No, I'm not referring to Romans 5 where Jesus is the second Adam. I'm referring to those oft forgotten lists of genealogies.

Take Genesis 5:3-5, for example. In this genealogy, Adam is not only listed as a father, but is given a lifespan. If you can manage to explain that away and continue to say that Adam was not a literal person, what about every other person in the list all the way down to Noah? If Adam is not literal, at what point do those gentlemen start becoming actual people?

But let's not stop there. You also have to deal with 1 Chron 1:1, Hosea 6:7, Luke 3:38, 1 Cor 15:45, and Jude 14.

Is the Adam of the rest of Scripture someone other than the "figurative" Adam of Genesis 1-3? If so, what about 1 Tim 2:13-14?

Curious if anyone would have a response, or perhaps this is helpful for you to bring up to others you may know who do not believe in a literal Adam.

BTW, two posts now related to Genesis. I'm just starting a Genesis 1-11 class, and reading several books for it... so more will probably come up.

Local Flood Question

I just had a question regarding the concept of a local, not global flood. If the flood was local (can anyone define "local"?), then why didn't God just tell Noah to move away and then come back?

Potential response #1: Because Noah had to save the animals.
Rebuttal: Even if all the animals in the "local" region died, surely it would get repopulated by animals coming in by other regions.

Potential response #2: It would take too long to move away and then come back.
Rebuttal: I couldn't find in the text where it says how old Noah was when God told him to build the ark, but at that time it probably took several years(?). Surely it would have been less to time to move himself and his three sons far away and then return. Furthermore, why even return? Why not just inhabit another part of the planet?

Any other ideas? Just curious.

Does Denying Exhaustive Foreknowledge Acquit God?

The following is a paper I wrote last semester for my Theology I class on the Doctrine of God (otherwise known as Theology Proper). My paper is a critique on a narrow aspect of Open Theism, namely, their attempt to acquit God from being the ultimate cause of evil and sin.

Introduction

Open theism is a relatively new theological perspective which seeks to provide a unique model for how we understand God. At its core are the denial of absolute sovereignty and exhaustive foreknowledge of God, and the affirmation of libertarian free will of man. Openness proponents claim a significant pastoral benefit in that God is acquitted from being the author of sin and acquitted from being to blame for evil and tragedies which occur in our lives. He is also hailed as preserving freedom and allowing humans to make decisions apart from divine coercion. The ensuing debate has created no small stir in the evangelical academic environment. Though a relatively small number of books have been written on the issue, significant debate has permeated theological journals and popular publications.

In denying God’s exhaustive foreknowledge, open theists have had to deliver a new understanding of prophetic texts where it appears God has at least some level of knowledge of the future. Regardless of which explanation open theists offer, they claim that no prophecy requires exhaustive foreknowledge of the future. The purpose of this paper is to examine that claim and determine whether open theists succeed in acquitting God from evil and intervening significantly in human affairs to accomplish his will. My goal is to demonstrate that open theism, far from acquitting God, makes him liable for innumerable sins and forces him to intervene in significant ways such that human freedom and responsibility is significantly damaged. I will examine two prophetic statements which open theists use to advance their position showing how they really do damage to their position.

Before beginning, an important note is in order. Discussing open theism is difficult because a number of issues are interrelated and it is difficult to approach any discussion without assumed presuppositions. For example, in debating whether God has exhaustive foreknowledge it is necessary to establish the knowability of the future, God’s relationship to time, whether God is self-limiting or externally limited, whether foreknowledge requires determinism, etc. Often debates on specific issues go unsettled because both sides operate with different presuppositions which go under-challenged or are entirely ignored. For the purpose of this paper, an entirely open theist perspective is assumed. The question being answered is not whether the traditional model is absolutely correct, but whether open theism can maintain structural integrity in its own framework.

Open Theist View of Prophecy

John Sanders, a major proponent of openness theology, has put forth what appears to be the most common openness view of prophecy. In his book The God Who Risks Sanders explains there are three types of prophecy: (1) conditional, (2) inferential, and (3) absolute. Conditional prophecies are those which are dependent on human actions. They are the if… then… prophetic statements such as Deuteronomy 28 which contains predictions of blessings or curses depending on the obedience of Israel. Nineveh is an example of an implicit if… then... because though no condition is given in Jonah’s preaching, the repentance of the city resulted in the relenting of the prophesied wrath. An inferential prophecy is one where God utilitizes his exhaustive knowledge of the past and present to make a prediction of the future—he infers from the past and present to declare the future. Absolute prophecies are those which God guarantees regardless of human actions. Open theists highlight prophecies where God can act unilaterally apart from human agents to accomplish his will (the incarnation), however they also admit that God can and does override human freedom to accomplish his will (the crucifixion). Such coercion is the exception, not the rule in how God relates to humans. It is this third category which we must investigate further.

Divine Omniscience

Before exploring open theisms claim of absolute prophecy, it is critical to understand their proposal for divine omniscience. My goal here is not to significantly interact with, but to attempt to give a baseline understanding which will provide stimuli for the discussion on absolute prophecy.

The traditional understanding of omniscience in its various definitions has included complete and absolute knowledge of the past, present, and future. Open theists, in an effort to maintain traditional terminology have not redefined omniscience directly, but more fundamentally, knowledge. In essence, open theists say God knows everything any being could possibly know, yet because the future has not happened (i.e., it does not exist in reality), it does not meet the requirements of a knowable fact. In this understanding, the term omniscience can be maintained because it does not limit God’s knowledge of that which is knowable. A brief illustration should suffice. One cannot say that because God does not know about an alternative universe inhabited solely by aliens he is not omniscient. Just as the unreal alternative universe is not a candidate for knowledge as a matter of fact, the unrealized future is also not a candidate for certainty.

This is not the end of the matter, however. Since the future is yet unrealized, it is in a state of potential and possibility. Therefore open theists go on to say that God knows every possible thing that could occur, and even further, the probability level of their occurring. In the context of near infinite potential realities, God has plans which he has made known through Scripture. While he does not know for certain how those plans will come about, he knows all the potential paths to fulfillment and, if all else fails, his omnipotence can be used to accomplish his will. In other words, God cannot be certain how his plans will be accomplished, but he can be certain that they will. With regard to this, Boyd highlights God’s infinite intelligence to the degree that “there is virtually no distinction between knowing a certainty and knowing a possibility. God thus gains no providential advantage by knowing future events as certain as opposed to knowing them as possible.” In other words, though Boyd cannot claim certainty for God (in many cases), he virtually claims it based on God’s intelligence.

While it appears all the major open theists have written in agreement with the above understanding of divine omniscience, there are some who prefer to distance themselves from the idea that the future is inherently unknowable. Dallas Willard advances the view that the future is knowable, but God simply chooses not to know it, much like Jesus chose to limit the expression of his deity while on earth. For the purpose of this paper I am assuming the more common understanding for two reasons: First, I have not found Willard’s view among the most popular open theists (Pinnock, Sanders, Boyd). Second, it appears to “re-tie” the knot open theism attempts to untie. Namely, open theists claim that if the future is a matter of fact it must be determined (actively or passively), therefore libertarian freedom is removed. Because open theism’s primary concern is the preservation of libertarian freedom, the future cannot be determined in any sense. Cuthbertson surmises, “in committing oneself to open theism, one is committed to a certain philosophical position with regard to time.” In other words, in order for open theism to maintain its structural integrity, it must be consistent in its view of time. An open theist believing in a determined future is closer to a classic Arminian, than an open theist.

One final caveat offered by open theists is critical to understanding the framework. Though God cannot know what has not been realized, and though he does know every possibility and its degree of probability, God can determine whatever he pleases for the future. Boyd states that God “foreknows certain things are going to take place because he knows his own purpose and intention to bring these events about. As sovereign Lord of history, he has decided to settle this much about the future.” This is distinct from Willard’s view in that Willard states the future is knowable, but God chooses not to know it. Boyd states that it is not knowable except that which God determines.

Having established the open theist understanding of divine omniscience, we move on to understand and critique open theism’s understanding of prophecies where grand levels of detail are displayed which appear to demonstrate profound knowledge of the future.

Absolute Predictions

In God of the Possible Boyd navigates numerous examples that he considers “Settled Aspects of the Future.” The de facto approach to understanding settled aspects of the future is to conclude that when Scripture speaks definitively and specifically of the future, it does so circumstantially rather than universally. In other words, just because God can give a detailed prophecy (e.g., Peter’s denial), it does not mean that God knows all of the future exhaustively. On the surface it appears that such a statement is correct. No single prophecy necessarily teaches nor entails exhaustive foreknowledge. However when one considers the arguments both exegetically and logically, that conclusion quickly appears to oversimplify what God does when he makes a definite and specific prophecy. The rest of this paper will interact with two examples provided by open theists to show that while exhaustive foreknowledge is not necessary, the open theist interpretations inherit the same criticism given to exhaustive foreknowledge.

Prophetic Statements Which Involve Vast Foreknowledge
Prediction of Captivity

Genesis 15:13-15 records the revelation to Abraham that Israel will be held in a foreign land for 400 years. By analogy, Boyd responds to this prediction by attempting to show that within the boundaries of such predictions, innumerable free decisions could be made without affecting the overall prediction. What food was eaten, marital decisions, attitudes, etc. are all examples which ultimately bear little or no impact on Israel’s 400 year hiatus in Egypt. Boyd’s point comes across clearly, namely, that God doesn’t need to know every decision that everyone makes in order to predict a 400 year exile. Yet Boyd neglects the full prediction which is significantly more specific than simply predicting the 400 years.

The prediction God made is clear and extensive. There are ten aspects that are all interrelated: 1) they will be sojourners in a foreign land, 2) they will be servants, 3) they will be afflicted, 4) it will be for 400 years, 5) God will judge the foreigners, 6) they will be freed, 7) they will leave with abundance, 8) Abraham will die old and before any of this happens, 9) they will return in the fourth generation, and finally, the ultimate reason behind all this, 10) because the iniquity of the Amorites is incomplete. Genesis 15:16 sheds a bright light on the 400 year prediction. God predicted the 400 year exile on the basis of the iniquity of the Amorites. Further, God did not randomly decide to wait 400 years before dealing with the Amorites. He said their iniquity would not be “complete” until 400 years was over. Whatever measure God is using to make that statement, it is difficult to see how one could get around the fact that there are 399 (or so) years where God knows in advance that their sin would not be complete, and then finally he knows that it is complete after 400 years. For God to know this for certain, under the open theist framework, he would have to determine it. For God to determine 400 plus years of sin seems far outside the range of what open theists would want to claim as necessary intervention. This is to say nothing of the eight other details God predicted.

An exegetical issue is worthy of consideration. God’s use of the term “certain” forces us to conclude that this was determined and could not fail. This is not an intelligent guess based on exhaustive knowledge of all future possibilities, this is a certainty. With this much, Boyd appears to agree. Yet one has to question how God could make such a certain and specific prediction without knowing how it would occur. According to open theists, at this point in Genesis God is not yet certain of Abraham’s faith because it isn’t until many years later (Gen. 22) that God finds out for sure that Abraham trusts him. How could God be so certain about the future of Abraham’s descendents in Genesis 15 and yet require such a drastic test of Abraham’s faith in Genesis 22? It doesn’t seem to make sense that God could make a determination while still being uncertain as to the participation of the key player—Abraham. Clearly the answer from open theists is that since God knows all possibilities and their probabilities, he knew that the way things turned out is how they would likely turn out, or at least he knew generally how things would shape up and he would ensure it came together in the end. A more simple answer would seem to be that God was already certain of Abraham’s faith before making the 400 year prediction and the test with Isaac served a different purpose. This seems clear from the previous verses where Abraham believed God “and it was counted to him as righteousness” (Gen. 15:6).

Additional details seem troublesome. Richard Rice explains that God reacted to the Joseph’s brothers’ action by using it to preserve the Hebrews from the famine. Yet such an explanation ignores Joseph’s testimony in Genesis 45 when he repeatedly states that it was “God [who] sent me before you to preserve life” (v. 5). It was “God [who] sent me before you to preserve for you a remnant on earth” (v. 7). “It was not you who sent me here, but God. He made has made me a father to Pharaoh, and lord of all his house and ruler over all the land of Egypt” (v. 8). It was “God [who] has made me lord of all Egypt” (v. 9). After the death of Jacob, Joseph had to reassure his brothers that “you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good” (50:20). The clear emphasis is on God’s initiative through human agents, not his response to them.

The famine itself is troubling in the open theist framework. The entire discussion of God’s lack of foreknowledge centers around human freedom. But a question which open theists have yet to answer is how much does God know about other future events, in this case, weather. The debate over global warming aside, weather is completely uncaused by human action (at least it was back then). Certainly the open theist would claim God can predetermine weather, but we must assume (in the open theist framework) that generally God does not know what the weather will be like in the future. One could be quick to say that God determined the weather when he gave Pharaoh the dreams hoping to get Joseph out of prison, but as mentioned above, Joseph claims that God sent him to preserve life. The reference is, of course, to preserving Israel through the seven-year famine. If God somehow knew about the famine, it must have been before Joseph went to Egypt. According to open theists, the only way for God to know the future is to determine it. Therefore, God must have determined the famine, presumably for the purpose of getting Israel into Egypt. Precisely when God determined this cannot be known. In addition, it cannot be known whether God enjoyed free humans acting in such a way that fit his famine plan, or if he necessarily coerced many actions (e.g. the sin of Joseph’s brothers) in order to get Israel in Egypt. It would seem that the latter must be the case because to imply that God determined a severe weather pattern in order to get a large family (who knew nothing of the famine) to move away from their promised land without any external pressure seems like an odd way to force the move.

The sin of the Amorites, the certainty of the prediction, and the foreknowledge of the famine do not automatically require exhaustive foreknowledge. However, such a significant amount of information of the future is necessary in this prediction that all the charges open theists make against exhaustive foreknowledge such as determinism, loss of freedom, and making God responsible for sin would be necessarily applied on a grand scale in the 500 years or so of history where these predictions took place. No, exhaustive foreknowledge is not required, but the effect of exhaustive foreknowledge (according to open theists) is no different than the effect of this supposedly partially determined plan.

Peter’s Denial

The specificity with which Jesus predicts Peter’s denial is so powerful that open theists have had to come up with plausible explanations. Several different explanations have been offered including an inferential explanation where Jesus knew all the present factors and could predict with accuracy Peter’s response to a certain situation. Sanders mentions how Lorenzo McCabe offers a determined explanation where God purposefully determined the denial and eventual restoration in order to prepare Peter to lead the church. It appears Sanders doesn’t take that position, but prefers a conditional understanding. He explains at length that the denial did not need to occur, and that the prediction was no prediction at all, but a warning about what would happen if he wasn’t careful. Boyd (taking the inferential side) states that “we do not know how much, if any, supernatural intervention was employed in God’s orchestration of the events of that evening. But the outcome was just as he anticipated.” In other words, the prediction could have involved multiple methods of knowing.

According to Boyd, God’s perfect knowledge of Peter’s character in conjunction with the present circumstances made it obvious what Peter would do under extreme pressure. Yet he has not made a reasonable case for such a drastic change in Peter’s behavior. Up until the disciples (including Peter) fled when Jesus was arrested, Peter demonstrated nothing but courage and loyalty. Boyd’s explanation is that Peter assumed Jesus was a military leader and when that expectation was removed he lost confidence. Boyd forgets, however, that earlier in Jesus’ ministry that in the midst of a mass rejection, Peter affirmed his loyalty to Jesus not on the basis of his political aspirations, but on the basis of Jesus’ “words of life” (John 6:68). By the time of Jesus’ arrest, the disciples could only have been strengthened in their resolve that Jesus was the Messiah. Indeed the disciples on the road to Emmaus acknowledged as much (Luke 24:21). Therefore it doesn’t make sense that Peter was utterly predictable in his denial. If anything one would think Peter would have fought the soldiers arresting Jesus to the death had Jesus not stopped him.

Of course Peter’s denial is only part of the prediction. As with the sin of the Amorites, timing is everything. Jesus predicted Peter would deny him “before the rooster crows”. Not once, but three times. “Anyone who knew Peter’s character perfectly could have predicted that under certain circumstances (that God could easily orchestrate), he would act just the way he did.” There are at least two problems with this statement by Boyd. First, no one could have known Peter’s character perfectly in the future. Certainly God could have known it at the moment of the prediction, but Peter was still loyal at the time. Boyd claims (without proof) that Peter’s character was solidified toward predictable denial , but until fleeing, we are given no record of Peter showing any inclination toward desertion. Since there was no prior history, God could not have known for certain how Peter would react under “certain circumstances.” What Boyd is allowing God here he denies from God elsewhere in the case of Abraham’s test with Isaac. Somehow God could predict a totally contradictory act with Peter, but not a relatively consistent pattern with Abraham. As of yet open theists have not answered the question of why Peter did not deny Jesus twice or four times, and how was three times predictable by his character?

Beyond Peter’s character is the issue of the rooster crowing. Certainly nothing in Peter’s character or the nature of the situation precipitated that detail being predictable. It could have taken the entire day to get the three denials. Open theists must fall back on the claim that God simply ordained the timing and therefore could know it in advance. This begs the question: if Jesus knew Peter would deny him three times by the time the cock crowed, did he know what would cause those denials? Did he know that there would be trials during the night and that Peter would be trying to listen in? Did God coerce those who questioned Peter into doing so in order to accomplish his plan? Finally, if Peter’s character was solidified in denying Christ once he realized Jesus was not the Messiah Peter thought he was, wouldn’t that imply a lack of freedom in the denial? How could such a solidified character weep as Peter wept realizing what he had done?

It seems as though the clearest explanation is that Jesus knew exhaustively what would happen. He knew Peter’s unrevealed character, where Peter would be, that Peter would be within earshot of a cock crowing, that Peter would be challenged three times to identify himself, and that he would deny it three times. If God orchestrated (determined) certain aspects to cause Peter to deny him, then God is equally liable to the charges made against exhaustive foreknowledge. God is just as responsible for sin. God has removed libertarian freedom from Peter and those who identified him, making the lesson meaningless for Peter since he had no choice except to deny him.

Conclusion

Open theism stands as a stalwart proponent of human libertarian freedom. Whether limited externally by the nature of knowledge or internally by self-limitation, God is put forth as one who guards human freedom to the greatest possible extent. Open theists have not been convinced by the efforts of scholars who have attempted to demonstrate how exhaustive foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom (to an extent), and that libertarian freedom itself is an unbiblical position. Yet when faced with intricate prophecies which seem to indicate God’s exhaustive foreknowledge, open theists simply claim that God can know certain things, and doesn’t need to know everything to make those predictions. They are right to the extent that the text does not make explicit mention of God’s exhaustive foreknowledge. But where their explanation falls short is in realizing the extent of information God must know in order to make predictions with certainty. If an entirely determined future does irreparable damage to the God-human relationship, making God responsible for sin, and making humans robots that could do nothing other than what God determined, what of the open God who necessarily determined certain aspects to fulfill his will? Is God not culpable for the sin of Joseph’s brothers? Is he to blame for the massive havoc the seven-year famine caused in the ancient world? Is he not liable for the deaths of the Hebrew children commanded by Pharaoh since he put them there? Is he not responsible for generations of the Amorites whose sin he knew beforehand? Is Peter’s denial genuine since God must have determined enough of it to make it certain? Did those who identified Peter do so freely, or were they coerced by God?

Those who hold to exhaustive foreknowledge have made multiple contributions in books and articles demonstrating how divine exhaustive foreknowledge and human freedom (understood properly) can be compatible. Thus far open theists have yet to significantly challenge those explanations. Additionally, open theists have yet to explain how the open God can determine anything of the future without being culpable of the same charges they make against the traditional view of God.

Modern Day Pharisee

Though not too often, I have heard comments made to the effect that conservative Christians are modern day Pharisees. With the brief concession that there are some extreme fundamentalist groups (together with their schools) who perhaps could be classified as Pharisees, I am convinced that conservative Christians couldn't be farther from a Pharisee.

At its most basic level, I believe this false accusation is more a compliment to Pharisees than a slam on conservative Christians. Or to put it another way, the accusation greatly misunderstands the Pharisees and places a false (and better than deserved) stereotype on them.

For the record, lets consider Jesus' beef against the Pharisees. There are, of course, a great many passages for this, so I'll just mention two.

1) In 15:1-9 Jesus confronts their fundamental sin: "why do you break the commandment of God for the sake of your tradition? . . . 'This people honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me; in vain do they worship me, teaching as doctrines the commandments of men.'"

2) Chapter 23, the famous "woe to the Pharisees" chapter. Let's get some of the highlights from the text:

- v. 4: "They tie up heavy burdens, hard to bear, and lay them on people's shoulders, but they themselves are not willing to move them with their finger."
- v. 13: "You shut the kingdom of heaven in people's faces. For you neither enter yourselves nor allow those who would enter to go in."
- v. 15: "You travel across sea and land to make a single proselyte, and when he becomes a proselyte, you make him twice as much a child of hell as yourselves."
- v. 27: "You are like whitewashed tombs, which outwardly appear beautiful, but within are full of dead people's bones and all uncleanness."
- v. 33: "You serpents, you brood of vipers, how are you to escape being sentenced to hell?"

It is obvious that the Pharisees had a lot of issues. Certainly they were human, just as we are, and therefore we share with them in the sins that are common to man. But it must be understood that Jesus didn't cast his most violent and damning speech on them because they were prideful or wanted to be exalted in the eyes of others. Those are surface issues that everyone deals with (even tax collectors and prostitutes). When we deal with issues of pride, fear of man, selfishness, you-name-it, even hypocricy, we are not acting like Pharisees. We are acting like sinful people.

The root problem of the Pharisees that invited Jesus' human wrath and God's eternal wrath was their false religious system. They set up their tradition over and against God's Word. When they read and interpreted God's Word it was selective and only to serve their own purposes. The religion of the Pharisees was not "Judaism" as God had established it through Scripture. Therefore Jesus treated them like a cult who distored Scripture by adding, removing, and modifying it. Pharisees put their hope fully in themselves and their works. They had no room in their theology for God's grace toward sinners. They had no room for mercy. It was follow their rules (not God's), or be the subject of their scorn (not God's).

Are conservatives sons of hell? Do they made their converts twice the sons of hell? Are they full of dead men's bones? Are they unable to escape hell? Do they prevent people from entering the kingdom?

To call conservative Christians the modern day Pharisee is paramount to calling it a false religion.

There is another related issue that needs to be dealt with (briefly, because I have a serious headache). Some have also said that if Jesus came today that we would reject him. I say we would have every biblical right to reject him. Even if someone came with miracles we should remember that the Anti-Christ will perform miracles even to where he could deceive the elect if it were possible. If he came today like he did 2000 years ago (though wearing modern clothing), that means we have completely misunderstood everything and are a false religion. Setting up that type of scenario is faulty thinking. It assumes that Jesus could come in that way again, which goes against our understanding of Scripture. The question is not "would I accept Jesus coming today like he did then," but rather "do I accept Jesus today for who he was then?"

This may require some more development and clarification in a non-headache moment, but for now here is a two-sentence summary:

When we, as born again Christian, sin, we do not act like Pharisees--we act like sinners. We did not kill God's Son as Pharisees. We killed God's Son as sinners. We did not say "This is the heir. Let’s kill him and take the inheritance." The tax collectors did not say it. The Pharisees said it (in the parable told by Jesus). It was said by those who were entrusted with the vineyard, not by everyone. We need to use proper hermeneutics to understand who said what and who did what so we can properly compare ourselves.

If you want an example of what I think is modern day Pharisee, probably the best correlation is Catholicism.

The pejorative term Pharisee should be reserved for people destined for hell who are guilty of the same fundamental sin of the Pharisees, and never used for those bound for heaven.

Book Review: God's Lesser Glory by Bruce Ware

“Readers will find this book unkind to open theism” (9). To what extent? “We have [in open theism], then, a fundamentally different god, not merely a different version of God” (230). Such are the opening and closing remarks of a devastating analysis of open theism. Bruce Ware, Senior Associate Dean of the School of Theology at The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, is the author of God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism. The book is organized in three main sections: (1) What is it? (2) What’s wrong with it? And (3) what difference does it make? There is one question asked and answered on virtually every page of this book. It is the very question concluding a series of questions presented in the first chapter: “is such a God the God of the Bible?” (18). The answer returns again and again as an emphatic “No.”

The introductory chapter provides the motivation for the reader to be concerned about the issue. Ware details some of the influence open theism has had in Baptist General Conference as an example that this issue is not fortified in the walls of academia, but is in fact finding refuge and strength in congregations around the country. Not all churches have opened their gates to this teaching, as exemplified by the Southern Baptist Convention. Publishers such as InterVarsity Press and Baker Books along with Christianity Today have provided a platform from which open theism has reached the Christian church at large. Though this chapter is focused on understanding the importance of this issue, the analysis of open theism throughout the book solidified this theme.

Theologies usually have some measure of foundation in formerly existing doctrines, and Arminianism turns out to be the foundation of open theism. Ware explains how Arminianism in its traditional expression is seen as faulty in the eyes of open theists because it does not allow for true libertarian freedom. Therefore open theism begins with the Arminian foundation of God’s love, human freedom, and genuine worship, and seeks to be consistent in its understanding of the relationship between God’s omniscience and man’s free will. The reconciliation of God’s omniscience with man’s freedom is the root issue in open theism. Ware explains from the open theist perspective how they perceive traditional models of understanding as faulty, and their own model as viable.

The “perceived” viability of open theism is presented in chapter three as Ware brings forth the primary tenets that open theism attempts to derive from Scripture. The first major principle is that God’s openness allows for real relationship between and people. Because God learns and can be surprised by human actions, he can have a real relationship and not one based on absolute foreknowledge. Secondly, because God does not know the future, everything he does involves some measure of risk. God risked rejection when he created the world for the sake of relationship, and he lost the bet, so to speak. Third, because God cannot always know the outcome of his decisions, it is not uncommon for him to repent as in the decision to flood the world. Fourth and perhaps most important, because God does not know the future and allows people to have libertarian freedom, he is not to blame when tragedy strikes. Here in summary form are the primary issues which Ware addresses in detail throughout the rest of the book.

If one could conclusively demonstrate the fallacy of open theism’s rejection of the doctrine of God’s exhaustive foreknowledge, the debate comes to an abrupt end. This is exactly what Ware has accomplished in chapter four. Walking through the biblical texts used by open theists Ware clearly shows how the “straightforward” readings by open theists are invalid, either by immediate context or by other texts which directly relate to the issue. The careful attention to the whole counsel of God reveals how open theism must ignore or deny one text in order to affirm a certain understanding of another. At times Ware appeals to logical conclusions using the narrow straightforward interpretation to show how one cannot maintain such ideas without denying other explicit teachings about God.

Contrary to open theist ideas, Scripture has a lot to say about God’s exhaustive foreknowledge regarding the breadth and the depth, the extent and the content of what God knows. Many of these texts are treated in chapter five as Ware unleashes the doctrine of God’s foreknowledge. Though space does not allow extensive commentary on each passage, Ware shines the light of the glory of God as demonstrated in his foreknowledge. Open theists claim that often these texts refer to a specific situation, or are limited instances of foreknowledge, and it is going too far to attribute exhaustive foreknowledge. The former claim is certainly true, however Ware demonstrates that in order for God to foreknow and control one, two, and the many situations and prophecies laid out in Scripture, it would take exhaustive foreknowledge because of the infinite number of variables which could alter the future.

In attacking God’s foreknowledge, Ware demonstrates how open theism indirectly attacks God’s wisdom. Chapter six gives a clear and thorough argument against the attack of the only wise God.

The effect of all this in our daily lives is devastating. It actually creates a different kind of Christian; one who can’t pray with confidence, need not ask God for guidance, and does indeed have reason to blame God for tragedy. Chapters seven through nine are dedicated to this and one cannot help but grieve for Christians under open theist pastors.

Reading this book has two effects for the Christian who believes strongly in the deity of God. First, it creates anger and frustration over a doctrine which makes God in man’s image. Second, it causes us in the depth of our soul to worship the God of Romans 11:33-36.

Translation Theory Introduction

The act of translating of a text from one language to another has been a necessity since the Tower of Babel when God confused the language of the people (Gen. 11:1-9). Though translation has been done throughout history, formal theories of translation—and the resulting debates—have only been in existence for the last century. Until the Gutenberg invention of the printing press in 1456, only 33 of the world’s approximately 6,170 languages had a translation of Scripture. At the end of the 20th century, over 2,000 languages, or 80% of the world, had parts or the entire Bible available to them. The increase from 33 to over 2,000 did not occur gradually. In fact, even 400 years after printing press, still only 67 languages had some portion of the Scripture. The 19th and 20th centuries saw a dramatic increase in missionaries and organizations committed to translating Scripture which naturally demonstrated the need for standard methodology of translation.

There are two primary translation theories which continue to be the center of increasingly fervent debate. Though terminology has varied over the years, it appears the dust has begun to settle regarding what to call the theories: Formal Equivalence and Functional Equivalence. Much time and effort has been spent on arguing for each position, and I have found it difficult to get a brief synopsis of each side with its proposed arguments. This paper is an effort to allow both sides to make their arguments without analytical comment. The purpose is not to come to a conclusion on which method is superior, but rather to have a fundamental understanding of the arguments for each position.

Key Terms and Definition
Many specialized areas of study have their own set of terms and vocabulary that are necessary to keep in mind in order to navigate the field. Misunderstood definitions often draw needless arguments, therefore where a definition undergirds one side of the debate, I will present the definition from that viewpoint.

Formal Equivalence. Leland Ryken has written the most recent and somewhat controversial book in this debate. He takes his stand on the formal side of the debate and defines it as follows: “a theory of translation that favors reproducing the form or language of the original text, and not just its meaning. In its stricter form, this theory of translation espouses reproducing even the syntax and word order of the original; the formulas word for word translation and verbal equivalence often imply this stricter definition of the concept.” By mentioning the “stricter form,” Ryken hints at the reality that there are varying levels of formal equivalence. The strictest end would be a word-for-word lexical translation which makes no other changes to the text. Such a translation has not been made for distribution, but its closest cousin would be the American Standard Version (ASV) which is considered by all as the most literal translation available. The other end of the formal spectrum would most likely be the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV).

Functional Equivalence. Originally this view was called Dynamic Equivalence but more recent works attempt to leave the word “Dynamic” behind in favor of “Functional.” Eugene Nida is the undisputed father and proponent of the Functional Equivalent method. He defines this method as follows: “[it] consists in reproducing in the receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the source-language message, first in terms of meaning and secondly in terms of style.” Nida immediately states that such a definition requires “careful evaluation of several seemingly contradictory elements.”

Source and Receptor Language. Source or native language is simply the original language from which the translation is based. In the case of Bible translation, it refers to Greek, Hebrew, and Aramaic. Conversely, receptor language is the language which receives the translation.

Transparent Text. This term is used in two different ways, equally defined by both methods. In the context of functional translation, this term indicates that the message of the original text is transparent to the receiving reader. In the context of formal translation, it indicates that the translation is transparent to the original text. In the former, the message is clearly seen, in the latter, the original form is clearly seen. The two definitions are not mutually exclusive, but rather emphasize either aspect of the translation.
Formal Equivalence Method

The practice of translating Scripture according to what we now call formal equivalence has been the general practice of translators through the centuries. Advocates of functional translation methods are quick to point out passages where historical translations veer from the original, yet it is clear that ancient translations are primarily formal in nature. English translations in particular have historically leaned toward a formal translation. Clearly the evidence demonstrates that an unofficial standard of formal equivalence has been the practice of the church. With that historical background, let us now look at the various arguments put forth by advocates of this position.

Arguments for Formal Equivalence
Retaining the words. Words matter. Words are the fundamental units of language. Meaning and ideas are derived from words and are dependent on the words in their individual meaning combined with syntax and grammar. Therefore the most basic and objective method of transferring meaning is to maintain the translated words. Leland Ryken makes the argument that “there is no such thing as a disembodied thought… when we change words, we change meaning.”

Minimal interpretation. Robert Thomas acknowledges that translation does include a degree of interpretation, but it must be avoided “as much as possible by transferring directly from the surface structure of the source language to the surface structure of the receptor language.” Ryken refers to the needed interpretation as “linguistic interpretation” as opposed to “thematic interpretation.” The former seeks to find the receptor language words which best convey the source language word meanings as opposed to finding a new way of expressing the meaning of the section with or without the same words. The more interpretation that is done in translation, the more the translation becomes a commentary.

Original meaning. Along similar lines with the previous argument that interpretation should be kept to a minimum, is the idea that the translation should convey the meaning of the original text, not the translator’s interpretation of it. The main goal is to give the reader the transparent text of the original so that they can come to their own conclusion when there is a difficulty in the text. This comes to the forefront most on ambiguous passages. It is the job of the reader, not the translator to determine the original meaning of the ambiguity .

Leave it to the reader. According to the formal translation method, if the reader does not understand elements of the original (idioms, theological words, symbols, history, etc.), they should be willing to study or use an aid rather than have a translation that requires no effort. Since it is nearly impossible to know the background of the typical reader, it is best to make the translation transparent to the original and challenge the reader to do the work of interpretation. This not only increases the abilities of the reader, but it also causes them to think carefully about Scripture as opposed to reading quickly when everything is easy to understand.

Objective limits. Perhaps the greatest desire of formal translation advocates is to hide the translator and make the translation transparent so that the original shines through. Formal equivalence places great emphasis on the objectivity which with translation is done so that multiple translators can come up with essentially the same translation. Side-by-side comparisons of multiple formal translations show minimal difference which often come down to linguistic interpretation.
Centrality of the text. When it comes to Scripture as set apart from other books, preserving the original text as much as possible should be the focus of translation. The further translations stray from the original text, the less it can be trusted and ethically deemed the Word of God.

Functional Equivalence Method
The proliferation of missionaries around the world in the last two centuries and the subsequent need for translations in primitive languages has brought problems to the fore that had not been dealt with on a major scale in the past. These problems can be understood best in the form of questions. How do you translate “Lamb of God” when a tribe has no concept of sheep? Is it legitimate to invent words in a language which has no corresponding word for “justification”? Do you maintain a literal translation of an idiom when that same idiom has a completely different (and undesirable) meaning? In response to these and other questions Eugene Nida, in conjunction with Wycliffe Bible Translators and other organizations, has developed the functional equivalent method of translation. The functional method of translations elevates meaning over form and reader over author.

Arguments for Functional Equivalence Method
Meaning is everything. “Translating must aim primarily at “reproducing the message.” To do anything else is essentially false to one’s task as a translator.” Mark Strauss states it more bluntly, “Every translation must change what is said (in Hebrew and Greek) to capture what is meant.” No two languages have a one-to-one correspondence to any significant degree. Therefore in order to maintain meaning, it is necessary to leave the source language form behind and find a meaningful form in the target language which will carry the same meaning.
Provoke a response. Scripture was not written to convey facts and truths with no impact to how we live. Therefore translation should seek to invoke the same response for the modern reader that the original hearer experienced. In other words the translation should have the same impact at the outset.

Simple, not complex. God has given us his revelation for us to understand. It is the translator’s responsibility to translate it in such a way that people can easily understand without aid. In addition there are settings where study aids are not available such as an oral reading. The translation must relieve the text of ambiguities and statements or forms which can be understood more than one way so that people can hear and respond to the Word. Nida puts it this way, “If we assume that the writers of the Bible expected to be understood, we should also assume that they intended one meaning and not several, unless an intentional ambiguity is linguistically 'marked.'”

Respect the language. Those who work on the front lines of Bible translation on the mission field are keenly aware that every language is unique. Each language has its own “word-building capacities, unique patterns of phrase order, techniques for linking clauses into sentences, markers of discourse, and special discourse types of poetry, proverbs, and song…” A functional translation takes this into account and seeks to form a translation as though it were native to the receptor. Readers of the translation should not feel like they are reading a translation.
Respect the originals. Hebrew and Greek are languages like every other language. They suffer from the same limitations, ambiguities, and cultural influences. We must not treat them as though they are divine languages to be preserved for eternity. Rather, we must recognize that God communicated in the language of the people in the original writings, and as faithful translators we must translate into the modern language of the people with the receptor’s own idioms, grammar, vocabulary, and syntax.

Priorities. When we commence translating God’s Word, we must have priorities as to who the target readers are. Whether the readers are scholars or children will make a significant difference in the vocabulary and structure used. For wide-distribution translations, certain priorities must be kept in mind. Non-Christians should have priority over Christians. There are two simple reasons for this: (1) intelligibility allows Scripture to be an instrument of evangelism, and (2) it prevents Scripture from becoming obscure “high church” language. The second target age is 25-30 as opposed to children or older adults. The reason is that older adults who are used to a generational language understand terms and phrases which have gone out of use for decades. On the other hand children have a limited vocabulary and are not able to recognize literary features very well. People ages 25-30 have the established English skills and the current vocabulary which generally bridges the gap between all ages. Finally, there are times when the language of women needs priority over that of men. While this would not apply in the United States as much, foreign countries often have a “work-place vocabulary” that women are unaccustomed to. In these cultures where women remain at home, it follows that they teach the children. Therefore the women must understand the translation best in order to instruct the children.

I have attempted to demonstrate the primary arguments put forth by each side of the debate. In my research I have discovered that there are issues which need to be addressed more in order to think more critically. One unanswered question is whether the principles for translating into an established language with a tradition of Bible translations should be the same as translating into a language which has not previous translation and perhaps no literature tradition at all. Another question is whether translating Scripture should have different principles than other forms of literature, particularly since proponents on both sides believe in plenary inspiration.
There is one issue to which all parties agree: translating and spreading Scripture is a high calling and we must apply all diligence in the process. Whether it is supplying a Gospel to a native in Mongolia who has only the Quran, or whether The Gideons are supplying Bibles to hotel chains across the world, the Word must get out by the hands of faithful men.